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COMMENTS
THE REGULATION OF UNION POLITICAL ACTIVITY:
MAJORITY AND MINORITY RIGHTS AND REMEDIES
I. INTRODUCTION

The national debate concerning the appropriate role of labor
unions in American politics has, from its inception, been marked by
a high degree of emotionalism. For the most part this debate has
focused on the wisdom of various regulatory approaches. Although
some observers feel that unions as organizations should be barred
from political activity, others believe that a union's freedom of
political activity should be unfettered. The polarization of views
on this subject is reflected in the contradictory provisions of section
112 of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) Amendments
of 1976,1 which regulate union political activity in federal elections.
'Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283,
§ 112, 90 Stat. 475, 486-92 (repealing 18 U.S.C. § 608, 610 (1970 and Supp. V
1975)) (to be codified in 2 U.S.C. § 441a, 441b, and scattered sections of 2, 26
U.S.C.). Section 112 of the 1976 Amendments, the main statutory section regulating union political conduct, provides in part:
(a) It is unlawful . . . for any corporation whatever, or any labor
organization, to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any
election at which presidential and vice presidential electors or a Senator or
Representative in, or a Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, Congress are
to be voted for, or in connection with any primary election or political
convention or caucus held to select candidates for any of the foregoing
offices, or for any candidate, political committee, or other person knowingly
to accept or receive any contribution prohibited by this section, or any
officer or any director of any corporation or any national bank or any
officer of any labor organization to consent to any contribution or expenditure by the corporation, national bank, or labor organization, as the case
may be, prohibited by this section.
(b) (1) For the purposes of this section the term "labor organization"
means any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which
exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers
concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.
(2) For purposes of this section . . . the term "contribution or expenditure" shall include any direct or indirect payment, distribution, loan,
advance, deposit, or gift of money, or any services, or anything of value
*. . to any candidate, campaign committee, or political party or organization, in connection with any election to any of the offices referred to in
this section, but shall not include (A) communications by a corporation
to its stockholders and executive or administrative personnel and their
families or by a labor organization to its members and their families on
any subject; (B) nonpartisan registration and get-out-the-vote campaigns
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Although section 112 is cast in terms of a general prohibition of
such activity, it nevertheless permits organized labor to maintain
its position as one of the most powerful interest groups in American
politics.2

Unfortunately, the policy debate that has shaped the regulation
of union political activity has largely obscured the fundamental
question of the constitutionality of such regulation. Four competing
interests are at stake: the first amendment rights of unions, the first
by a corporation aimed at its stockholders and executive or administrative
personnel and their families, or by a labor organization aimed at its members and their families; and (C) the establishment, administration, and
solicitation of contributions to a separate segregated fund to be utilized for
political purposes by a corporation, labor organization, membership organization, cooperative, or corporation without capital stock.
(3) It shall be unlawful(A) for such a fund to make a contribution or expenditure by
utilizing money or anything of value secured by physical force, job discrimination, financial reprisals, or the threat of force, job discrimination, or
financial reprisal; or by dues, fees, or other moneys required as a condition
of membership in a labor organization or as a condition of employment,
or by moneys obtained in any commercial transaction;
(B) for any person soliciting an employee for a contribution to
such a fund to fail to inform such employee of the political purposes of
such fund at the time of such solicitation; and
(C) for any person soliciting an employee for a contribution to
such a fund to fail to inform such employee, at the time of such solicitation, of his right to refuse to so contribute without any reprisal.
(4)(A) Except as provided in subparagraphs (B), (C), and (D), it
shall be unlawful(ii) for a labor organization, or a separate segregated fund established by a labor organization, to solicit contributions to such a fund from
any person other than its members and their families.
(B) it shall not be unlawful under this section for a corporation, a
labor organization, or a separate segregated fund established by such
corporation or such labor organization, to make 2 written solicitations for
contributions during the calendar year from any stockholder, executive or
administrative personnel, or employee of a corporation or the families of
such persons.
(5) Notwithstanding any other law, any method of soliciting voluntary contributions or of facilitating the making of voluntary contributions
to a separate segregated fund established by a corporation, permitted by
law to corporations with regard to stockholders and executive or administrative personnel, shall also be permitted to labor organizations with regard
to their members.
(6) Any corporation, including its subsidiaries, branches, divisions,
and affiliates, that utilizes a method of soliciting voluntary contributions or
facilitating the making of voluntary contributions, shall make available
such method, on written request and at a cost sufficient only to reimburse
the corporation for the expenses incurred thereby, to a labor organization
representing any members working for such corporation, its subsidiaries,
branches, divisions, and affiliates.
2 See text accompanying notes 16-17 infra.
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amendment rights of union members who oppose their union's
political stance, the state's interest in dispelling corruption or the
appearance of corruption, and the public's interest in receiving
information. Even if the tension between the state's regulatory
interest and the first amendment rights of the union is resolved, an
even more delicate question remains concerning the degree to which
the union's exercise of its first amendment rights may infringe upon
the first amendment rights of its dissident members.3 Although
these questions are analytically distinct, they are not entirely independent of one another. In fact, the rights of dissidents have been
advanced as justification for regulation in this field. 4 This Comment will suggest that the interrelationship of these competing
interests is helpful in understanding section 112 and in evaluating
its constitutionality.
The present regulatory system was implemented partly in
response to the Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo 5 and
is the most explicitly detailed of Congress' attempts to regulate
union political activity in federal elections. Nonetheless, confusion
persists regarding what unions may legally do in the political
sphere, 6 despite the basic similarity between the current statute and
the first statute that regulated union political activity, the War
Labor Disputes Act of 1943.7 This Comment will therefore attempt
to clarify what actions may be taken by union members acting
through their union in the political sphere. In defining the rights
of the majority, the current statute, its legislative antecedents, the
interpretations the courts have applied to this legislation, and the
constitutional considerations underlying the regulation of political
expression will be considered. The rights and remedies of union
members who disagree with their union's political stance will then
be discussed. In particular, dissenters' claims that their union's
political expenditures violate their first amendment rights will be
considered in light of the Supreme Court's decisions in International
3 For a discussion of the state action aspects of a union's functions under a

union security clause, see text accompanying notes 171-80 infra.
4
See United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 115 (1948).
5 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
6See 122 CONG. REc. S3555-3558 (daily ed. Mar. 16, 1976) (remarks of
Sens. Packwood and Cannon).
7Pub. L. No. 78-89, ch. 144, § 9, 57 Stat. 163, 167-68 (1943) (amending
§ 313 of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-506, §313,
43 Stat. 1070, 1074 (repealed 1948)) (current version to be codified in 2 U.S.C.

§ 441b).
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Association of Machinists v. Street 8 and Abood v. Detroit Board
of Education.9
II. A HisToRy OF UNION POLiTicAL AcrIvTY
A. The Degree of Involvement
Working people in America, banded together for mutual selfhelp, have a long history of political activity.10 The last halfcentury has witnessed the labor movement's greatest impact on
American politics. Alexander Heard, a noted scholar of American
campaign finance, has suggested that "[i]n some jurisdictions the
guts of the politics is the competition of rival economic enterprises,
the political forum replacing the market place as the arena of the
free enterprise system." 11 Labor organizations now realize that the
political arena, as well as the bargaining table, is a crucial forum
for their interests.
As the federal government has increasingly legislated in
the field of union activity and on economic matters such
as wages, hours and conditions of employment which are
of the most immediate concern to laboring men as workers
and as union members, the necessity for labor union political activity has correspondingly increased. Today the
passage or defeat of any number of bills affecting working
men and their unions may be of as great importance to
12
union members as the collective bargaining process itself.
When unions enter the political fray, their greatest asset is
not the financial resources they command, but rather "the web of
personal and institutional influences by which they are linked to
large numbers of people in relationships of dependence and respect." 13 Indeed, a reliance on economic force alone would place
labor at a permanent disadvantage with respect to corporations,
which generally have substantially greater financial resources. 14
8367 U.S. 740 (1961).
9 97 S. Ct. 1782 (1977).
10 For a concise survey of union political activity since 1730, see Woll, Unions
in Politics: A Study in Law and the Workers' Needs, 34 S. CAL. L. IEv. 130,
144-49 (1961).
"A. HEAnD, TBm Cosrs or DEmocncY 113 (1960).
2
1 Rauh, Legality of Union Political Expenditures, 34 S. CAL. L. Rtv. 152,
163 (1961).
13 A. HEAR,

supra note 11, at

206.

14 In 1958 unions collected about $600 million in dues from their members, an
amount smaller than the annual after-tax profits of General Motors at that time.
Id. 171 & n.8.
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Nevertheless, the major legal controversies involving union political
conduct have all focused on the use of union monies. 15 The attention devoted to labor's financial impact on politics stems from the
magnitude of its involvement. For example, in 1972 labor contributed $3.6 million to the campaign coffers of congressional candidates. 6 This figure represented the single largest dollar input by
any broad interest group; however, it accounted for only five and
two tenths percent of the contributions received by those
7
candidates.'
Individual political contributions, coupled with contributions
from groups associated with corporations, labor unions, and other
organizations, as well as self-financing by candidates, and, most recently, public financing efforts, translate into the millions of dollars
that are available to finance election campaigns. In 1968 these
campaign expenditures reached an estimated $300 million.,8 Although this figure may seem large in the aggregate, a partial explanation lies in the fact that Americans fill over half a million
positions by means of the electoral process. 19 Expenditures of such
a size have been characterized as part of the inevitable "costs of
democracy" needed "to expose an electorate to the views and personalities of those who through its favor seek to govern." 20
The magnitude of campaign contributions and spending
naturally directs unions to maximize their financial power in the
15 See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 97 S. Ct. 1782 (1977); Pipefitters
Local 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385 (1972); United States v. UAW, 352 U.S.

567 (1957); United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948).
16 1 CommoN CAuSE, 1972 FEDERAL CAmPAIGN FINANCES, INTEREST Gnoups
Congressional candidates in 1972 received
AND PourncAL PAnn~s, at vi (1974).

contributions totalling $69.7 million. Id. at iv. Of these contributions, $16.6
million came from special interest contributors and political party committees, id.
at v, with $3.6 million originating with labor affiliated groups and $3.4 million
originating with business, agricultural, and health organizations. Id. at vi.
17 For a discussion of the major sources of labor affiliated contributions, some
leading recipients, and certain patterns of giving, see 2 id. at x-xi.
The disparity between the enormity of labor's role in absolute terms and its
more modest role in comparative terms can be explained by the propensity of
Americans in the second half of the 20th century to participate in politics in a
variety of ways in addition to voting, such as signing petitions, engaging in political
discussions, ringing doorbells for candidates, and contributing to campaign coffers.
ELATIONS OF TnE Coamm. ON GovSENATE SuBcoanms. ON INTERGOvERNmENTAL
ERNmENT OPERAnONs, 93d Cong., Ist Sess., CONFImENCE AND CONCERN: CrTIZENs
Vmw AmERiCAN GovERNmENT, pt. I 256 (1973). Today the proffering of campaign contributions constitutes an important act of political expression for many.
According to a survey commissioned by the Senate in the aftermath of Watergate,
33% of all Americans 18 years of age and older have contributed to a political
campaign at one time or another. Id. 256.
N
38 (1972).
18 H. ALEmXDER, FoImCAL FANCING
19 A. HEARD, supra note 11, at 8.
20Id.
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political arena. For example, a union may undertake an educational campaign to induce union members who might otherwise
have remained inactive to make a political contribution. 21 Another
obvious method of increasing political effectiveness is to aggregate
large numbers of small contributions. 22 The fear of aggregated
wealth, however, originally prompted the regulation of corporate
political activity-a form of regulation that has since been applied
23
in equal measure to labor unions.

B. Regulation and Interpretation:Congress and the Supreme Court
1. The Early Statutes
In a message to the Wisconsin legislature in 1905, Governor
Robert M. LaFollette condemned the pernicious effect of corporate
intrusions into politics:
The participation in government of the corporation as
a corporation is a menace. Its action is governed by no
sense of individual or personal responsibility. It is controlled by no sentiment of patriotism. Corporations are
organized for profit and gain, and enter the field of politics
solely in4 the interests of the business for which they are
2

created.

Similar fears and resentments caused Congress to exercise its prima
facie power to regulate the conduct of federal elections 25 in enacting
the Tillman Act of 1907.2 The twin legislative purposes of com21 Id.110.
22

CENTuRY FUND, ELEcmTnG CONGnESS 66-67 (1970).
See United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 113 (1948).
24 State v. Joe Must Go Club, 270 Wis. 108, 111, 70 N.W.2d 681, 682 (1955)
(emphasis in original), quoted in Comment, Civil Responsibility for Corporate
Political Expenditures, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1327, 1331 n.25 (1973).
25 For a discussion of Congress' prima facie power in this area, see A. RosFN-

TvWE.r

23

THAL, FEDERAL REGULATION or CAmPAIGN FNAcE: Somm CONSrrUTXONAL QUES-

12-19 (1972); Comment, The Constitutionality of Restrictions on Individual
Contributionsto Candidates in Federal Elections, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1609, 1614-16
(1974). Article I, § 4 of the Constitution authorizes the congressional oversight of
elections for United States senators and representatives. Although Congress' power
was at one time understood not to apply to the party nomination process, Newberry
v. United States, 256 U.S. 232 (1921), the way to the congressional regulation of
this process was opened by United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). Even
in the absence of an explicit constitutional grant of authority, the Supreme Court
has found that Congress is empowered to regulate presidential elections as well.
Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545 (1934). Congress' power to regulate
federal elections was most recently reaffirmed in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
13-14 & n.16 (1976).
26Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864 (1907) (current version to be codified in
2 U.S.C. § 441b).
TIONS
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batting corporate influence over federal elections and protecting
shareholders from having their funds expended for political purposes without their consent were reflected in the Act,2 7 which pro-

hibited corporate money contributions in connection with a federal
election. 28 Such a legislative approach was necessitated by the
absence of any common law authority that barred corporations
29
from making political contributions.
Congress' next major effort in this area was the enactment of
section 313 of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925.30 Although section 813 retained the spirit and most of the wording of
the Tillman Act's prohibition, it broadened the definition of "contribution" to include "a gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit,
of money, or anything of value, and includes a contract, promise,
or agreement, whether or not legally enforceable, to make a
contribution." 31
Following the outbreak of World War II, Congress turned its
attention to the political activities of unions:
The need for unprecedented economic mobilization propelled by World War II enormously stimulated the power
of organized labor and soon aroused consciousness of its
power outside its ranks. Wartime strikes gave rise to fears
of the new concentration of power represented by the gains
of trade unionism. And so the belief grew that, just as the
great corporations had made huge political contributions
to influence governmental action or inaction, whether
consciously or unconsciously, the powerful unions were
pursuing a similar course, and with the same untoward
consequences for the democratic process.3 2
27
28

See United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 113 (1948).
The Act provided in relevant part:

That it shall be unlawful for any national bank, or any corporation or-

ganized by authority of any laws of Congress, to make a money contribution in connection with any election to any political office. It shall also
be unlawful for any corporation whatever to make a money contribution
in connection with any election at which Presidential and Vice-Presidential
electors or a Representative in Congress is to be voted for or any election
by any State legislature of a United States Senator.
Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864, 865 (1907) (current version to be codified in
2 U.S.C. § 441b).
29 See Comment, Corporate Campaign Funding, 4 Cum.-SA. L. REv. 544,
547 (1974).
30 Pub. L. No. 68-506, § 313, 43 Stat. 1070, 1074 (1925)
(repealed 1948)
(current version to be codified in 2 U.S.C. § 441b).

31 Id. § 302(d), 43 Stat. 1070, 1071.
32

United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 578 (1957).
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Congress responded by passing the War Labor Disputes Act of
1943, 33 which contained a provision extending the prohibitions
applicable to corporate political activity in federal elections to labor
unions for the duration of the war. Just as the regulation of corporate political activity was designed to curb the influence of
aggregated wealth 34 and to protect minority shareholders from having their funds expended for political purposes without their consent, so was this Act designed to achieve the same results with regard
to unions. 5 In committee hearings, Representative Landis, the
sponsor of a portion of the Act, asserted that labor unions and
corporations should be placed on an equal footing with respect to
the federal regulation of their political activity:
The public thinks, and has a right to think, that labor
unions, as public institutions should be granted the same
rights and no greater rights than any other public group.
My bill seeks to put labor unions on exactly the same basis,
insofar as their financial activities are concerned, as corporations have been on for many years.3 6
This equation of corporations and labor unions remains a hallmark
of the federal regulation of elections to this day.3 7
After the war, Congress adopted the Labor Management
Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947.38 In amending section 313
of Federal Corrupt Practices Act, section 304 of Taft-Hartley permanently applied to unions the same ban on political contributions
in federal elections that applied to corporations. In addition, section 313 of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act was revised to ban
expenditures as well as contributions. 39 The presidential election
of 1944 revealed that the word "contribution" was easily circumvented; unions played a major financial role in various elections
33Pub. L. No. 78-89, ch. 144, § 9, 57 Stat. 163, 167-68 (1943) (current
version to be codified in 2 U.S.C. § 441b).
34
See S. REP,. No. 101, 79th Cong., Ist Sess. 24 (1945); To Regulate Labor
Organizations: Hearings on H.R. 804 and H.R. 1483 Before a Subcomm. of the
House Comm. on Labor, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1943) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings] (statement of Rep. Landis).
35 See Hearings, supra note 34, at 117-18, 133; 89 CoNG. REc. 5334 (remarks
of Rep. Halleck), 5792 (remarks of Sen. Revercomb) (1943).
36
Hearings, supra note 34, at 1.
37See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-283, § 112, 90 Stat. 475, 490-92 (to be codified in 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a6 441b, and
scattered sections of 2, 26 U.S.C.).
33 Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80101, 61 Stat. 136 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-88) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
39 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (repealed 1976) (current version
to be codified in 2 U.S.C. § 441b).
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through indirect contributions, such as the publication of newspapers and advertisements on behalf of selected candidates. 40 By
banning expenditures as well as contributions, Congress sought to
41
fulfill more adequately the purposes of the Act.

2. The Supreme Court Decisions
Few cases arose under the Federal Corrupt Practices Act prior
to the inclusion of unions within the statutory ban. Nearly all of
the major cases under this statute or the relevant sections of
FECA and its amendments that have reached the Supreme Court
have involved labor unions. Despite invitations to decide these
cases on constitutional grounds, the Court has consistently declined
to do so.

42
Although this approach has evoked vociferous criticism,

the resulting construction of the statutes has more exactingly defined
the demarcation between permissible and impermissible union
political conduct.
In the first of these cases, United States v. CIO,43 the Court

considered an indictment charging the CIO and its president with
a violation of section 313 of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, as
amended by section 304 of the Taft-Hartley Act, for having published and distributed an issue of The CIO News, an organ owned
and published at union expense. The paper contained an editorial
advocating the election of a candidate in a special congressional
election in Maryland. The district court found this activity to be
of the very type that Congress had prohibited.44 Finding no "clear
and present danger to the public interest," however, the court held
the provision to be an abridgement of first amendment rights and
45
dismissed the indictments.
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of
the indictments, but its opinion was based on nonconstitutional
grounds. The Court asserted:
If § 313 were construed to prohibit the publication, by
corporations and unions in the regular course of conduct40

See 93 CONG. aREc.6436-39 (1947); Hearings, supra note 34, at 23-24.

41 See United States v. CIO,
4
? See, e.g., United States v.

335 U.S. 106, 115 (1948).
UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 595-98 (1957) (Douglas, J.,

dissenting); United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 139-40 (1948) (Rutledge, J.,
concurring); Cohan, Of Politics, Pipefitters, and Section 610: Union Political Contributions in Modem Context, 51 Tx. L. REv. 936, 942-43 (1973).
43335 U.S. 106 (1948).
44 United States v. CIO, 77 F. Supp. 355, 357 (D.D.C.), aff'd on other grounds,
335 U.S. 106 (1948).
45 Id. 357-58.
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ing their affairs, of periodicals advising their members,
stockholders or customers of danger or advantage to their
interests from the adoption of measures, or the election to
office of men espousing such measures, the gravest doubt
46
would arise in our minds as to its constitutionality.
Unlike the district court, the Supreme Court found that the Act
was not intended to apply to an expression of the union's political
views in a regularly published union newspaper whose distribution
was limited substantially to union members. This conclusion was
47
based on the Court's reading of the Act's legislative history.
Justice Rutledge, in a concurring opinion, found the Court's construction to be untenable, asserting that the statute as applied was
"patently invalid" as a "sweepingly comprehensive" restriction on
first amendment rights.48
The Court's statutory construction in CIO nevertheless avoided
the necessity of ruling on the constitutionality of the statute. 49 In
construing the statute, the Court sought to implement the original
purposes of section 313: restricting the influence of aggregated
wealth over elections and prohibiting the involuntary use of potential dissenters' funds for political purposes.50 In the wake of CIO,
the lower courts followed the Supreme Court's lead in construing
the statute narrowly; 51 but in the next major case concerning union
political activity that reached the Supreme Court, United States
v. UA W, 2 the Court held that the union's conduct did violate the
statute. The UAW was charged with using union dues to finance
46

335 U.S. at 121.

Id. 115-21.
48 Id. 130, 132 (Rutledge, J.,concurring); see text accompanying notes 106-10
infra.
49 Id. 124.
5o Id.113.
51 In United States v. Painters Local 481, 172 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1949), the
court reversed the conviction of a union president who, with the authorization of a
special membership meeting, paid $111.14 for a political advertisement in a daily
47

newspaper and $32.50 for a radio broadcast with funds from the general treasury.

The court found it impossible to distinguish CIO, holding that because the union
owned no newspaper, its expenditures were the natural way to communicate its
views to its members and thus were not prohibited by the statute. Similarly, in
United States v. Construction & General Laborers Local 264, 101 F. Supp. 869
(W.D. Mo. 1951), the court found that the union's payment of compensation to
three employees, a large portion of whose services involved political activities, did
not violate the Act. The court noted the "uncertain, insignificant amount" of the
e.xpenditure involved, id. 873, and concluded that if the union's activities were
prohibited "any political activity of any person on the payroll of a labor organization, from its president to its janitor, would render that Union and its principal

officers liable." Id. 876.
52352 U.S. 567 (1957).
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television broadcasts that were intended to influence congressional
elections. Distinguishing CIO, the Supreme Court remanded to
the district court for trial:
[U]nlike the union-sponsored political broadcast alleged in this case, the communication for which the defendants were indicted in C.I.O. was neither directed nor
delivered to the public at large. The organization merely
distributed its house organ to its own people. The evil at
which Congress has struck in § 313 is the use of corporation
or union funds to influence the public at large to vote for
a particular candidate or a particular party.53
As in CIO, the Court relied upon its interpretation of the statute's
legislative history 54 to support the conclusion that the union's conduct was "precisely the kind of indirect contribution . . . that
Congress amended § 313 to proscribe." k5
The UAW Court again declined to rule on the statute's constitutionality, asserting that any potential constitutional issue needed
to be developed in the first instance at the trial level. 56 Justice
Frankfurter, writing for the majority, did, however, suggest several
tests by which the statutory issues involved could be approached:
[W]as the broadcast paid for out of the general dues of the
union membership or may the funds be fairly said to have
been obtained on a voluntary basis? Did the broadcast
reach the public at large or only those affiliated with [the
union]? Did it constitute active electioneering or simply
state the record of particular candidates on economic
issues? Did the union sponsor the broadcast with the intent
to affect the results of the election? 5
The effect of the CIO and UAW opinions was to prescribe a
case by case approach for the regulation of union political activity
based upon the Court's reading of the statutory language, while
avoiding any underlying constitutional difficulties. In the 1970's,
however, Congress again turned its attention to the regulation of
589 (emphasis supplied).
541d. 577-88.
55 Id. 585.
56 Id. 591-92.
531d.

571d. 592. Lower courts in turn have used these tests as indices of statutory
violations. See, e.g., United States v. Lewis Food Co., 236 F. Supp. 849, 853
(S.D. Cal. 1964); United States v. Anchorage Central Labor Council, 193 F. Supp.

504, 506 (D. Alas. 1961).
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political activity by the passage of the Federal Election Campaign
Act of 1971 5s and subsequent amendments. 9
3. The New Regulatory Scheme: The Federal Election
Campaign Act and Amendments
Congress again addressed the regulation of campaign financing
in enacting the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971. Section
205 of the 1971 Act amended the definition of prohibited expenditures in section 610 of title 18 of the United States Code to exclude
specifically from the prohibition
communications by a corporation to its stockholders and
their families or by a labor organization to its members
and their families on any subject; nonpartisan registration and get-out-the-vote campaigns by a corporation aimed
at its stockholders and their families, or by a labor organization aimed at its members and their families; the establishment, administration, and solicitation of contributions
to a separate segregated fund to be utilized for political
purposes by a corporation or labor organization.60
Representative Hansen, the sponsor of this amendment, stated during congressional debate that the purpose of his amendment was
"to codify and clarify the existing law and not to make any substantive changes in the law." 61
The issue of voluntary contributions to a separate political
fund was addressed by the Supreme Court in Pipefitters Local 562
v. United States.0 2 In Pipefitters the defendant union and three
of its officers were convicted of conspiracy to violate section 610 in
regard to the expenditure of funds in a federal political campaign.
5
sFederal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3
(codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431454 (Supp. V 1975)). For a discussion of the major
provisions of the Act, see Comment, Campaign Finance Acts-An Attempted Balance
Between Public Interests and Individual Freedoms, 24 U. KAN. L. Ilv. 345, 368
(1976).
59 The Act was amended in 1974, see text accompanying notes 68-71 infra,
and in 1976, see text accompanying notes 76-82 infra.

00Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 205, 86 Stat. 10, 18 U.S.C. § 610 (Supp. II 1972 &
Supp. V 1975) (repealed 1976) (current version to be codified in 2 U.S.C. § 441b).
See Pipefitters
01 118 CONG. PE:c. 328 (1972) (remarks of Rep. Hansen).
Local 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 423-26 (1972).
62407 U.S. 385 (1972).
The union had collected a fund of $1,230,968
between 1963 and 1968. United States v. Pipefitters Local 562, 434 F.2d 1116,
1121 (8th Cir.), aff'd on rehearing, 434 F.2d 1127 (8th Cir. 1970) (en bane),
icv'd, 407 U.S. 385 (1972).
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The Supreme Court reversed the convictions, however, because of
an erroneous jury instruction concerning the voluntariness of the
3
contributions.
The Pipefitters test required that union funds for political
purposes must be voluntarily contributed and kept separate from
general union monies:
We hold that such a fund must be separate from the
sponsoring union only in the sense that there must be a
strict segregation of its monies from union dues and assessments. We hold, too, that, although solicitation by union
officials is permissible, such solicitation must be conducted
under circumstances plainly indicating that donations are
for a political purpose and that those solicited may decline
to contribute without loss of job, union membership, or
any other reprisal within the union's institutional
power....
[T]he test of voluntariness under § 610 focuses on
whether the contributions solicited for political use are
knowing free-choice donations. The dominant concern
in requiring that contributions be voluntary was, after
all, to protect the dissenting stockholder or union member. Whether the solicitation scheme is designed to inform the individual solicited of the political nature of the
fund and his freedom to refuse support is, therefore,
determinative.6 4
The Court did not ignore the congressional purpose of mitigating the effect of aggregated wealth on elections, but stressed that
the wealth Congress had in mind was "the general union Treasurynot the funds donated by union members of their own free and
knowing choice." 65 The Court labelled as a "misapprehension" 66
the idea that Congress intended to ban the aggregation and expenditure of members' voluntary contributions, while reaffirming
that "an indictment that alleges a contribution or expenditure from
the general treasury of a union or corporation in connection with
a federal election states an offense." 67 As in CIO and UAW, the
63407 U.S. at 399-400.
64 Id. 414-15 (footnote omitted).
65

Id. 416.

661d. 415-16 n.28.
67

Id. The Court stated, without deciding the issue, that the unanimous vote

of union members or stockholders of a corporation may at most be a defense to
such a contribution from general funds. Id.
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Supreme Court did not pass on the constitutionality of the statutory
system for the regulation of union political activity.
When the abuses of Watergate became public, Congress overhauled the system for regulating federal elections by the passage of
the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 6s which
"clamped tight restrictions with appropriate enforcement provisions upon campaign finances." 9 Although the scope of the
1974 Amendments was sweeping,70 the basic structure regulating
union political activity was not altered. No aggregate limitation
on contributions by organizations was imposed as had been done
in the case of individuals, nor were expenditure limitations imposed on organizations. These omissions allowed organizations,
such as a union political action committee, to retain great freedom
of political action if resources were available.7 1
The Amendments faced a major challenge in Buckley v.
Valeo3 2 The Supreme Court found that although the provisions
limiting campaign contributions met constitutional scrutiny, the
1974 Amendments' ceilings on independent expenditures, overall
campaign expenditures, and candidates' personal expenditures were
impermissible infringements on political speech.73 Moreover, the
Court held that the Federal Election Commission was unconstitutionally formulated.7 4 Nothing in the Court's opinion directly
68 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443,
88 Stat. 1263 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 5, 18, 26 U.S.C.).
09
Comment, Campaign Finance Acts-An Attempted Balance Between Public
Interests and Individual Freedoms, 24 U. Kx.L. REv. 345, 369 (1976).
7
o Among other items, the 1974 Amendments contained the following provisions: contributions by individuals were limited to $1,000 per candidate for federal
office with a total contribution ceiling of $25,000 yearly, for all candidates; expenditures by an individual "relative to a clearly identified candidate" were limited to
$1,000 per year; the amount of personal funds that could be spent by candidates
in their own campaigns was limited; total expenditure limits for federal campaigns
were specified; cash contributions in excess of $100 and contributions from foreign
countries were banned; reporting and disclosure requirements were strengthened;
the Federal Election Commission, with responsibility for oversight of the Act and
with civil enforcement powers, was created; and a public financing system for
presidential contests was elaborated. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 101, 88 Stat. 1263. Several of these provisions
were repealed or amended by the FECA Amendments of 1976. Federal Election
Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475 (to be
codified in scattered sections of 2, 26 U.S.C.). See text accompanying notes 76-82
infra.
71 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 28-29 n.31 (1976).

72424 U.S. 1 (1976).
731d. 58-59.
741Id.
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addressed the statutory framework regulating union political activ75
ity, however.
In direct response to Buckley, 76 Congress redrafted the Federal
Election Campaign Act to pass constitutional muster. The resulting Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976 reconstituted the Federal Election Commission, 77 maintained the individual
contribution limitations for federal elections at $1,000 per candidate
with an aggregate maximum of $25,000,78 removed candidate expenditure limits and ceilings on individual expenditures relative
to a particular candidate, 79 and maintained the limitation of $5,000
that a multi-candidate political committee may contribute to a
candidate for federal office. s0 No overall committee contribution
ceilings were established.
The 1976 Amendments to FECA repealed the sections of title
18 of the United States Code that regulated union political activity and recodified the provisions in amended form. Although the
general ban on the use of corporate and union funds is retained,,"
the Amendments describe with greater specificity the exceptions to
82
that general ban.
75 For a discussion of Buckley's implications for the constitutionality of the
regulatory scheme embodied in new §§ 441a and 441b of tit. 2 of the United States
Code, see text accompanying notes 120-35 infra.
76 See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 94-677, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2, reprinted in [1976]
U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 929-30.

77 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283,
§ 101, 90 Stat. 475, 475-477 (amending 2 U.S.C. § 437 (Supp. IV 1974)) (to be
codified in 2 U.S.C.).
78 Id. § 112, 90 Stat. 475, 487 (to be codified in 2 U.S.C. § 441a).
79 Id. § 201, 90 Stat. 475, 496.
SOld. § 112, 90 Stat. 475, 487 (to be codified in 2 U.S.C. § 441b). The
Amendments define a multicandidate political committee as one that "has been
registered under section 303 for a period of not less than 6 months, which has
received contributions from more than 50 persons, and, except for any State political
party organization, has made contributions to 5 or more candidates for Federal
office." Id.
The 1976 Amendments state that all contributions made by political committees
established by an organization will be considered to have been made by a single
committee. The legislative history of the Amendments clearly shows Congress"
intent with respect to this provision: "The anti-proliferation rules established by the
conference substitute are intended to prevent corporations, labor organizations, or
other persons or groups of persons from evading the contribution limits of the
conference substitute." HousE. CON. REP. No. 94-1057, at 58, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1976), reprintedin [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 946, 973.
81 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283,

§ 112, 90 Stat. 475, 490 (to be codified in 2 U.S.C. § 441b).
82 Id., 90 Stat. 475, 491 (to be codified in 2 U.S.C. § 441b).
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4. Permissible Union Political Activity
As a result of the framework created by the FECA Amendments of 1976 and by pre-existing case law and state regulations,
unions may engage in the following activities with general treasury
funds:
(1) communicate with union members and their families
on any subject whatever; 83
(2) conduct registration and get-out-the-vote drives aimed
at members and their families; 8
(3)if not prohibited by state law, 85 make contributions
to and expenditures supporting state and local candidates 86
and in connection with state and local referenda; 87
(4) expend funds aimed at the general public in an educational campaign; 98
(5) establish, administer, and solicit contributions to a
separate, voluntary political fund.8 9
The requirement for a separate fund may be met by "a strict
segregation of [the fund's] monies from union dues and assessments." 90 The union leadership is free to direct the fund and
83Id., 90 Stat. 475 (to be codified in2 U.S.C. § 441b). Active electioneering
directed at members and their families is clearly permitted. See, e.g., United States
v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948); United States v. Boyle, 338 F. Supp. 1028, 1033
(D.D.C. 1972).
84
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283,
§ 112, 90 Stat. 475, 491 (to be codified in 2 U.S.C. § 441b).
85
For a list of states that regulate or prohibit corporate and union contributions, see NATIONAL AsSOcIATION OF ATroRNEY GEnAis, LEGISLATIVE APPROACaES
To CAmpAiGN FiNANcE 16-17 (1974).
86
Section 441b of tit. 2 of the United States Code will leave open to unions
and corporations the possibility of contributing directly to nonfederal campaigns
from general union or corporate funds. Federal candidates who run on the same
ticket with the nonfederal candidates will be indirectly benefited by such contributions; in addition, these contributions may release funds to aid those candidates for
federal office in other respects. Rauh, Legality of Union Political Expenditures,
34 S.CAL.L. REv. 152, 152-53 (1961); A. HEARD, supra note 11, at 200.
87 See DeMille v. American Fed'n of Radio Artists, 31 Cal. 2d 139, 187 P.2d
769 (1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 879 (1948).
88 The prohibitions of § 112 of the FECA Amendments of 1976 are applicable
with regard to union political activity only in connection with party conventions
or caucuses, primary elections, or general elections for federal offices. Pub. L. No.
94-283, § 112, 90 Stat. 475, 491 (to be codified in 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a, 441b). The
statute would not prohibit, for example, a union educational campaign aimed at
creating public support for the repeal of all legislation regulating union political
activity or lobbying efforts toward the same end.
89 Id.
90
Pipefitters Local 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 414 (1972).
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solicit contributions to it. 91 In an effort to allay fears concerning
the use of coercive solicitation techniques by the union, title 2
specifically dictates that any person who solicits contributions to a
fund must inform the potential donor of the political purposes of
the fund and of the option to refuse to contribute without any
92
reprisal.
With the same general treasury funds, a union may not:
(1) make any contribution in connection with a federal
election; 93
(2) make expenditures in connection with a federal candidate if such expenditures are directed at the general public; 14
(3) accept or expend coerced contributions to a separate
political fund. 95
If a union establishes a separate, voluntary political fund, the
union may legally:
(1) contribute up to $5,000 per candidate for federal
office and up to $15,000 to a national party committee; 96
(2) make independent expenditures 11 of an unlimited
amount, including active electioneering aimed at the general
public; 9s

(3) use the fund for any purpose permitted to the general
union treasury fund.
91 Id.

92 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283,
§ 112, 90 Stat. 475, 491 (to be codified in 2 U.S.C. § 441b).
93 Id., 90 Stat. 475, 490.
94 Id. "The evil at which Congress has struck . . . is the use of corporation
or union funds to influence the public at large to vote for a particular candidate
or a particular party." United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 589 (1957) (emphasis
supplied).
95
Pipefitters Local 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 414 (1972).
96 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283,
§ 112, 90 Stat. 475, 487 (to be codified in 2 U.S.C. § 441a).
97 "[Ilndependent expenditure means an expenditure by a person expressly
advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate which is made
without cooperation or consultation with any candidate or any authorized committee
or agent of such candidate and which is not made in concert with, or at the request
or suggestion of, any candidate .... 2 Id. § 101, 90 Stat. 475, 479.
98 Although the "evil" pinpointed by the Court in UAW referred to unionfinanced electioneering that was aimed at the general public, note 94 supra, the
Court in Pipefitters made clear that the prohibition applied only to funds from the
union's general treasury and not to funds voluntarily contributed to a "separate
segregated political fund." 407 U.S. at 415-16 & n.28.
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Although the regulatory scheme that Congress has devised to
oversee federal elections is significantly more complex than the
Tillman Act of 1907, the language and objectives of that Act remain
central to the present system. The general rule as enacted by
Congress and construed by the courts is that corporations and unions
are barred from making contributions or expenditures from their
general funds with regard to a federal election. In this way, the
danger of aggregated wealth is partly addressed. That this ban is
not total, however, is evidenced by the authorization of separate
political funds financed by voluntary contributions. The requirement that such contributions must be voluntary and made with
knowledge of the purpose of the fund and absent any threat of
reprisal embodies the concern for protecting minority union members from having their funds expended for political purposes to
which they do not subscribe. The two original purposes for Congress' regulation in this area are thus both maintained in the
present system; but questions persist concerning the constitutionality of the statute's prohibition on the use of general treasury funds
for political purposes.
III.

CONSITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

IN

THE REGULATION

OF UNION POLITICAL ACTIVITY

A. The Grounds for a Constitutional Attack
The regulation of political activity inevitably raises serious
questions of constitutionality. "Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation
of the system of government established by our Constitution." 01
Contribution and expenditure limitations with regard to federal
elections have been held to "operate in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities." -00 If the sole concern in the
area of union political activities were to avoid any possibility of
impinging even peripherally on rights protected by the first amendment, that could be accomplished simply by deregulating all such
activities.'' This approach, however, would constitute a complete
abdication by Congress of its obligation to remedy the evils that
99 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976).
100 Id.

For a discussion of the implications of Buckley for the regulation of

campaign contributions and expenditures by individuals, see the sources cited in
Note, The Unconstitutionality of Limitations on Contributions to Political Committees in the 1976 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments, 86 YALE L.J. 953,
953 n.1 (1977).
101 See Comment, Corporate Campaign Funding, 4 Cu 1.-SAti. L. Rlv. 544,
559-60 (1974).
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originally prompted the passage of the Tillman Act. Instead, it is
necessary to examine how the union's freedom of speech conflicts
with the need to protect the integrity of the political system on the
one hand, and the rights of individual union members on the other.
As individuals, union members share all of the political rights
enjoyed by all other citizens, including the freedom to associate for
the common advancement of political beliefs. 102 Although corporations and unions as entities are not entitled to enjoy all the rights
and guarantees of liberty provided by the Constitution, 0" they are
guaranteed the freedom of speech.'10 A constitutional analysis of
regulation in this area also requires a consideration of the interests
of the public in receiving political speech because one goal of the
first amendment is the creation of "an informed public capable of
conducting its own affairs." 105
A concern for the first amendment interests of union members
in association, unions as organizations, and the public at large has
led many observers to conclude that the system of regulating union
political activity is unconstitutional. The most authoritative arguments to that effect have come from the Supreme Court itself. In
CIO, Justice Rutledge in concurrence argued that the Court's dismissal of the indictments should be based not on statutory construction, but on the patent unconstitutionality of the statute. 106 Displaying a sweeping belief in the tenets of pluralism, he extolled the
benefits of bloc representation, 10 7 which were presumably furthered
by union political activity. After citing the need for narrowly
08
drawn statutes when first amendment freedoms are involved,
Justice Rutledge found "no showing, legislative or otherwise, of
corruption so widespread or of 'undue influence' so dominating as
'10 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 57 (1976); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51,

56-57 (1973); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama,
357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
103 United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944) (constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination not applicable to unions); Western Turf Ass'n v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359 (1907) (corporation not protected against impairment by state
law of privileges and immunities of citizens of United States).
0 4
'
See Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308
(1968) (held overruled on other grounds by Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551
(1972), in Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976)) (unions); NLRB v. Fruit &
Vegetable Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 76 (1964) (Black, J.,concurring)
(unions); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (corporations);
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (corporations); Schwartz v.
Romnes, 495 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1974) (corporations).
105Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 392 (1969); see C & C
Plywood Corp. v. Hanson, 420 F. Supp. 1254 (D. Mont. 1976).
106 335 U.S. 106, 129 (1948) (Rutledge, J., concurring).
107 Id. 143-44 (Rutledge, J.,concurring).
108 Id. 141-42 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
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could possibly justify so absolute a denial of these basic rights." 109
His view of the statute's unconstitutionality derived in part from his
analysis of its pernicious effect on the political system:
There is therefore an effect in restricting expenditures for
the publicizing of political views not inherently present in
restricting other types of expenditure, namely, that it necessarily deprives the electorate, the persons entitled to hear,
as well as the author of the utterance, whether an individual or a group, of the advantage of free and full discussion
and of the right of free assembly for that purpose. 110
In his dissent in UAW, Justice Douglas cited Justice Rutledge's
opinion in CIO with approval, finding the regulatory scheme as
construed and applied to be "a broadside assault on the freedom
of political expression guaranteed by the First Amendment.""'
Although he acknowledged that Congress may regulate contributions under certain circumstances," 2 Justice Douglas dismissed
Justice Frankfurter's four guidelines for construing the statute 113
as irrelevant to the first amendment issues involved, 114 and he found
the Act too broadly drawn to serve solely the purpose of protecting
minority interests." 5 He suggested that the protection of minority
interests might instead be accomplished by following the British
practice of allowing dissenters to refuse to contribute for political
purposes. 6
Legal commentators have attacked the restrictions on political
contributions and expenditures along other lines. One thoughtful
analysis suggests that there is a distinction, unrecognized by the
courts or by Congress, between the electoral and political processes:
The electoral process may be defined as the necessary elements to a full exercise of the democratic franchise. It
would include, therefore, the processes of making a choice
109 Id. 146 (Rutledge, J., concurring). Because Justice Rutledge acknowledged
that Congress could regulate political contributions and expenditures by appropriate
measures not trenching on first amendment rights, id. 139, his objections must be
viewed in light of the totality of the ban on union contributions and expenditures
in federal elections. At the time CIO was decided, the statute did not specifically
exclude from the definition of expenditures funds to establish and administer a
separate political fund financed by voluntary contributions.
110 Id. 144 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
111352 U.S. 567, 598 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
112 Id. 598 n.2 (Douglas, J.,dissenting).
113 Text accompanying note 57 supra.
114 352 U.S. at 595-96 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
11 Id. 597 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
116 Id. 597 n.1 (Douglas, J.,dissenting).
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or selecting a representative, the procedures of candidate
selection (ballot access, nomination, primary elections, conventions, and caucuses), and the mechanics of casting ballots (forms, time, and place) ...
The political process, on the other hand, may be
defined as the broad concept of advocacy. It includes the
advocacy of ideas and the free and open discussion of
beliefs. In short, the political process is the formulation
by the people of governmental policy, whereas the electoral
n7
process is the formation of governmental administration.1
Under this analysis, the electoral process, because it is unrelated
to the content of political expression, would be open to regulation,
subject to the equal protection clause, while "the political freedoms
[would be] free from all governmental regulation, whether equally
applied or not, that directly suppresses free expression or regulates
its content."

118

Another line of analysis adopts a less absolutist approach but
arrives at the same conclusion of unconstitutionality. According
to this view, the legislative purpose of combatting aggregated wealth
is negated because the statutory provisions permit unlimited campaigning financed by the general treasury as long as it is aimed at
members and permit unlimited campaigning aimed at the general
public so long as it is financed by voluntary contributions. Therefore, one commentator found the sole remaining purpose of the
statute to be the protection of dissenters who may not wish to contribute to a particular candidate or cause. 1 9 Because the "true
dissenters" whom the statute was intended to protect may in fact
be few, and because less restrictive means of protecting minority
interests exist, this view favors a finding of unconstitutionality.
B. Buckley v. Valeo
Although Buckley v. Valeo did not directly address the ban on
union political activity then contained in section 610 of title 18, the
opinion cast some light on the constitutional considerations surrounding that section. Perhaps the most significant aspect of the
117

Comment, Campaign Finance Acts-An Attempted Balance Between Public

Interests and individual Freedoms, 24 U. KAN. L. REv. 345, 347 (1976) (footnotes

omitted).

Is Id. 350 (footnote omitted).

The Constitutionality of the Federal Ban on Corporate and
Union Campaign Contributions and Expenditures, 42 U. Cm. L. REv. 148, 151-52
119 Comment,

(1974).

The Supreme Court rejected this analysis in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66,

81-82 & n.13 (1975).
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Court's opinion was its acknowledgement of the validity of the governmental purpose underlying the regulation of federal election
campaigns: "It is unnecessary to look beyond the Act's primary
purpose-to limit the actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from large individual financial contributions-in order to find a
constitutionally sufficient justification for the $1,000 contribution
limitation." 120
The Court realized that the 1974 Amendments to FECA did
to some degree curtail first amendment rights, but it drew a distinction between limitations on contributions, which were held to
be constitutional, and limitations on expenditures, which were held
to be unconstitutional. The basis for the distinction lay in the
Court's understanding of the different purposes of contributions and
expenditures:
[A] contribution serves as a general expression of support
for the candidate and his views, but does not communicate
the underlying basis for support. The quantity of communication by the contributor does not increase perceptibly with the size of his contribution, since the expression rests solely on the undifferentiated, symbolic act of
contributing. At most, the size of the contribution
provides a very rough index of the intensity of the con.121
tributor's support for the candidate.
The restriction of expenditures, however, "necessarily reduces the
quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed,
the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience
reached." 122 The Court was unconvinced by the argument on the
one hand that limitations on individual contributions would decrease the total quantity of political expression. 23 On the other
hand, the Court was similarly unconvinced that the possibility of
individuals expending large sums of money in order to solicit political favors after the election justified the imposition of a ceiling
24
on independent expenditures.
The Buckley opinion, by analogy, reflects on the constitutionality of section 112 of the 1976 Amendments. The purpose of preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption was accorded
120 424 U.S. at 26.

Id. 21.
122 Id. 19.
123 Id. 21.
124 Id. 45.
121
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recognition by the Court as a legitimate government interest.125',
The opinion rejects the absolutist concept that any regulation of,
political activity is forbidden by the first amendment. Rather, the
specific pitfall that the statute must avoid is "substantial and direct
restrictions on . . . protected political expression." 120 Buckley V.,
Valeo, however, yields no easy answer to the question of what con-,
stitutes protected political expression.
C. The Application of Buckley v. Valeo to Section 112
Buckley contains language that supports the opposing views on,
the constitutionality of section 112. Supporting the view that the
statute is unconstitutional is the Court's rejection of the idea that'
"government may restrict the speech of some elements" of our
society in order to enhance the relative voice of others

.

2
27"

The Court found such an idea alien to the first amendment, which
was intended to foster "'the widest possible dissemination of information'" and "'to assure unfettered interchange Of ideas for
the bringing about of political and social changes desired-by the
people.'" 128 The Court asserted that the protection of the first
amendment could not depend on the degree to which an individual's wealth enables him to engage in public discussion. 129
It may be argued, however, that corporations and: labor unions
should be held to different and more stringent standards than an
individual or other associations under a regulatory scheme for campaign financing. The Buckley opinion-revealed that the Court would
consider practical considerations in reaching, a constitutional balance. For example, in discussing the limitations on contributions,
the Court reasoned that FECA's ceilings on contributions would
merely require a candidate to solicit funds from a greater number
of sources rather than reduce the total amount of money availabje
for financing campaigns. 13 0
A similar factual analysis in the case of unions and corporations
could lead the Court to conclude that a greater danger of corruption or the appearance of corruption exists in the case of unions
125 Id. 25-26.

126 Id. 58-59.
127 Id. 48-49.
128 Id. 49, quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266, 269
(1964) (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) and
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
129 Id.
130

Id. 21-22.
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and corporations 131 or that, due to the provision permitting separate political funds, the present statutory system simply does not
affect the amount of money available for political communication.
Furthermore, the Court indicated in Buckley that it was not applying a severe least restrictive alternative analysis. The Court held
that although such less restrictive measures as bribery laws and
narrowly drawn disclosure statutes could conceivably dispel the
appearance of corruption, Congress might reasonably conclude that
such measures were only a partial solution and that a broader statutory scheme was needed to deal with the reality of political
132
campaigns.
In view of the Court's willingness to defer to Congress in this
area, the differences between individuals and unions might lead the
Court to uphold the constitutionality of the scheme regulating a
union's political activity. First, the ban on union political contributions and expenditures is not total but applies only to general
union funds. Contributions and expenditures made by a separate
fund financed by voluntary contributions are specifically permitted,
as are expenditures of general funds to solicit contributions to the
separate fund. In order to engage in political discussion, a union
need only convince its members that its views are sound enough to
merit a contribution to a union political committee espousing the
same political philosophy. The necessity of convincing union members of the value of such a contribution does not amount to a constitutionally invalid burden. After all, if union members are so
unconvinced of the reasonableness of the union's position that they
refuse to support it, the argument for prohibiting the union from
spending dues money to support its political views is greatly
strengthened. In the case of individual political contributions,
there is only voluntary action on behalf of a candidate; no coercive
element that would raise first amendment questions exists. In the
case of unions, the statute strikes a legitimate and reasonable accommodation by distinguishing between the uses to which a separate, voluntary fund and the general treasury fund may be put.
A second consideration arguing in favor of the statute's constitutionality is the fact that the size of voluntary political funds
maintained by unions in recent years suggests that members do
support their union's endeavors in the political arena. Labor has
13,

For example, the Court in Buckley gave some weight to "pernicious prac-

tices," id. 27, that surfaced in the 1972 presidential election. With respect to
questionable, if not illegal, contribution procedures used by many corporations, see
generally G. THAYER, WHo SHiEs Trn
132

424 U.S. at 27-28.

MoNEY TREE? 108-22 (1973).
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emerged as the single most important broad interest group in the
funding of congressional campaigns. 33 As a result, it is difficult
to argue that the statute has caused a diminution in the "number
of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the
audience reached." 14
Buckley thus provides contradictory guidance on the constitutionality of section 112. The language striking down the expenditure limitations of the FECA Amendments of 1974 could be applied
equally to the expenditure ban placed on general union funds.
When viewed as a whole, however, the regulatory scheme is narrowly.and reasonably drawn to obviate the evil to which Congress
addressed itself: the use of general union funds for active electioneering aimed at the general public in connection with an
election for federal office. At the same time, the statute does not
prevent unions from "effectively amplifying the voice of their adherents, the original basis for the recognition of First Amendment
protection of the freedom of association." 135
IV.

THE DILEMMA OF DIssIDENTs

A. The Problem of Intra-UnionExpenditures
Despite the explicit statutory provision that permits a union
to expend a separate, voluntary fund for political purposes, section
112 of the 1976 Amendments to FECA still raises several problems
for union members who disagree with the political choices of the
union. 36 A union may expend funds raised by regular dues for
campaigning aimed at union members and their families; dues
monies may also be used to establish and administer a separate,
voluntary political fund.137 If, as can be expected, the union
hierarchy also heads the separate fund, the political direction of the
fund will most likely mirror that of the union itself. Consequently,
although the dissenter may not contribute to the separate fund,
his dues monies may ultimately further the same purposes to which
188
he objects.
133 Text accompanying notes 16-17 supra.

134 Buckdey v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (footnote omitted).
'85

Id. 22.

136 See Note, Corporate Democracy and the Corporate Political Contribution,

61 IowA L. REv. 545, 579 (1975).
137 See text accompanying notes 83-89 supra.
138 To the extent that the dissenter's funds help to defray the costs of administering the separate fund, he frees other funds that may be expended for active
electioneering.
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In addition, doubt has been expressed concerning the protection provided by the voluntariness requirement established in
Pipefitters and the statute itself. 3 9 Justice Powell, dissenting in
Pipefitters,worried that "[t]he trappings of voluntariness might be
achieved while the substance of coercion remained." 140 Herbert
Alexander, an observer of American campaign finance, has noted:
"[T]here are subtle kinds of coercion. If a shop steward in the
union asks a rank and file member to make a contribution to [a
political action committee], there's a subtle kind of pressure because
he wants to curry the favor of the shop steward." 141 The provisions
of the FECA Amendments of 1976, requiring that potential contributors be advised of the purpose of the fund and of their right
to refrain from contributing, 142 are positive steps in this regard, but
in a pervasively coercive atmosphere, their protection may be scant
indeed.
Nevertheless, unions are majoritarian institutions, and as such
offer channels for redirecting policy and structure. Union officials
are elected democratically, either by the direct vote of the members
or by the vote of democratically elected delegates. 1 43 These officials
normally set the political tone of the union and its committees, although some unions may choose their political endorsements by a
democratic convention system. 1'
One course open to dissidents,
therefore, is to challenge the politics of their leaders within the
structure of the union, because "the free speech rights of rank and
file members . . . include by definition a right of democratic insurgency, both at common law and under modern statutory
standards." 145 Union members have indicated that they are not
reticent to oppose the political course they perceive their national
officials to be following. 4 6
139 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283,
§ 112, 90 Stat. 475, 491 (to be codified in 2 U.S.C. § 441b).
140 407 U.S. at 449 (Powell, J., dissenting).
141 SyposiujM ON CAPAGN Fn
DIA rca
EGu. ATboN SPoNsoaw By ABA
SPECIL CoN
InEE ON ELECTION REFORM 66 (1975)
(comments of Herbert
Alexander). The opposing view has been expressed that the shop steward must in
fact curry the favor of the rank and file. Id. (comments of Steven Scholsberg).
42
1 See text accompanying note 92 supra.
143 Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, § 401(a), 29

U.S.C. §481(a) (1970).
144 Symposrum, supra note 141, at 66 (comments of Steven Scholsberg).
145 Cloke, Labor Democracy, Free Speech and the Right of Rank and File
Insurgency, 4 U. SAr FERN. V. L. REv. 1, 1-2 (1975).
146 See, e.g., McNamara v. Johnston, 522 F.2d 1157 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976); Colorado Labor Council v. AFL-CIO, 349 F. Supp.
37 (D. Colo. 1972), vacated, 481 F.2d 396 (10th Cir. 1973).
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Needless to say, an entrenched majority can be expected to
combat the efforts of a vocal minority, but should the majority
overstep its bounds and combat the dissidents with economic retaliation, such as revocation of union rights and privileges, individual
union members could seek relief under the rights guaranteed by
Title I of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
(LMRDA). 147 Aside from his LMRDA rights, a dissenter who is
discriminated against in the bargaining process or the administration of the collective agreement as a result of his political views
could seek redress in a suit for the violation of the duty of fair
48
representation.1
B. Street and Related Cases
If the majority victoriously combats speech with speech and
does not alter its political stance, the dissident may still object to
the expenditure of his dues for political purposes. The Supreme
Court was confronted with such a problem in three cases that arose
under the Railway Labor Act. 149 Section 2, Eleventh of the Act
specifically permits unions and employers to enter into union
security agreements by collective bargaining."1 0 Such agreements
could eventually force all employees to become dues-paying members of the union if they wish to retain their jobs. Unlike the
National Labor Relations Act, the Railway Labor Act contains no
provision allowing states to nullify the union security provision of
the Act.' 51
In Railway Employes' Department v. Hanson 152 a group of

railway employees sought to enjoin the enforcement of such a union
security clause on the ground that the agreement infringed their
first amendment rights. The trial court granted the injunction,
and the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed. The record in Hanson,
14729

U.S.C. §§ 411-15 (1970).

See Mitchell v. International Ass'n of

Machinists, 196 Cal. App. 2d 796, 16 Cal. Rptr. 855 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 370

U.S. 974 (1961) (union member could not be subjected to union discipline for his

political support of a "right-to-work" law, when such activity was not patently in

conflict with the best interest of the union). Contra, DeMille v. American Fed'n
of Radio Artists, 31 Cal. 2d 139, 187 P.2d 769, cert. denied, 333 U.S. 876 (1948)
(union member could be subjected to union discipline for failure to pay assessment

to oppose proposition allowing "right-to-work" law).
148See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co.,

323 U.S. 192 (1944).
149 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1970).

150 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh (1970).
151 Compare id. with 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1970).

1.52351 U.S. 225 (1956).
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however, was devoid of evidence of attempts to force ideological
conformity. The Supreme Court therefore reversed:
It is argued that compulsory membership will be used to
impair freedom of expression. But that problem is not
presented by this record. . .

[I]f the exaction of dues,

initiation fees, or assessments is used as a cover for forcing
ideological conformity or other action in contravention of
the First Amendment, this judgment will not prejudice
the decision in that case. For we pass narrowly on § 2,
Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act. We only hold that
the requirement for financial support of the collectivebargaining agency by all who receive the benefits of its
work is within the power of Congress under the Commerce
Clause and does not violate either the First or the Fifth
53
Amendments.1
In InternationalAssociation of Machinists v. Street 154 another
group of railroad employees similarly sought to enjoin a union shop
agreement. In Street, however, the employees alleged, 155 and the
trial court found, 15 6 that "the money each was thus compelled to
pay to hold his job was in substantial part used to finance the
campaigns of candidates for federal and state offices whom he opposed, and to promote the propagation of political and economic
doctrines, concepts and ideologies with which he disagreed." 157 It
was not alleged, however, that the expenditures violated the Federal
Corrupt Practices Act or any state corrupt practices legislation. 58
The Georgia courts found that the union's use of the mandatory
dues for political purposes violated the dissenters' first and fifth
amendment rights. 15 9
The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
Georgia court, finding that the union shop agreement itself was
not unlawful.'6" But the Court did not rule on the constitutionality of the nonconsensual use of dues money for political purposes, although the Court admitted that the record squarely presented constitutional issues. 161 Rather, the Court held that the
153 d. 238.
154 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
155 Id. 744.
156 Id. 744 & n.2.
57 Id. 744.
158 Id. 773 n.21.

159 Id. 744-46 & nn.3 & 4.
160 Id. 771.

161

Id. 749.
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Railway Labor Act itself does not permit a union to use a dissenter's dues against his wishes for political purposes. 16 2 The Street
Court asserted that a dissenter must first make his objections known
to the union, and then proposed two remedies to be considered on
remand:
One remedy would be an injunction against expenditure for political causes opposed by each complaining employee of a sum, from those moneys to be spent by the
union for political purposes, which is so much of the
moneys exacted from him as is the proportion of the
union's total expenditures made for such political activities to the union's total budget. The union should not be
in a position to make up such sum from money paid by a
nondissenter, for this would shift a disproportionate share
of the costs of collective bargaining to the dissenter and
have the same effect of applying his money to support
such political activities. A second remedy would be restitution to each individual employee of that portion of his
money which the union expended, despite his notification,
for the political causes to which he had advised the union
163
he was opposed.
In Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks v. Allen 164 the
Court clarified the conditions under which an employee may petition for the Street remedies. Specifically, the Court held that an
employee's opposition to political expenditures may be expressed
in a general, all-encompassing way, rather than by enumerating
each particular cause he opposed. 65
The Court's opinions in these three cases were based on statutory grounds, as in the Federal Corrupt Practices Act cases. Consequently, the question whether a union in a union shop situation
could use dues monies for political purposes to which the duespayer has objected without violating the dissenter's first amendment rights was left unanswered. That issue, however, was squarely
presented and decided in A bood v. Detroit Board of Education.166
C. Abood: The Constitutional Issue Confronted
Abood arose under a Michigan statute that permitted a union
and a local government employer to enter into an agency shop
Id. 765-70.
163 Id. 774-75.
164373 U.S. 113 (1963).
165 Id. 118. For an elaboration of this holding of Allen, see Abood v. Detroit
Bd. of Educ., 97 S. Ct. 1782 (1977).
162

16697

S. Ct. 1782 (1977).
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agreement "whereby every employee represented by a union-even
though not a union member-must pay to the union, as a condition
of employment, a service fee equal in amount to union dues." 116
Drawing upon the reasoning of Hanson and Street, the Supreme
Court upheld the agency shop principle. Unlike the Railway
Labor Act cases, however, the Court was unable to dispose of the
constitutional question by declaring that the use of a dissenting
member's dues monies for political purposes was prohibited by the
statute because the Michigan Court of Appeals had ruled that the
Michigan statute permitted such a use.16 Squarely faced with the
issue that was avoided in the Railway Labor Act cases, the Abood
Court held that compelled contributions by dissenters violated the
dissenters' first amendment rights: 169 "The fact that [the employees]
are compelled to make, rather than prohibited from making, contributions for political purposes works no less an infringement of
their constitutional rights." 170
The first amendment, of course, provides protection only
against actions of the state. The requisite state action was found in
Abood because local governments, as employers, entered into the
disputed agency shop agreements under a statutory authorization.
In Hanson and Street, the Railway Labor Act, which authorized the union shop agreement, provided an adequate nexus to state
action. As the Court pointed out in Abood, "[t]he plaintiffs' claims
in Hanson failed, not because there was no governmental action,
but because there was no First Amendment violation." 171 Neither
A bood nor Hanson and Street provide direct guidance, however, to
cases of a union shop agreement under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) .172
167

168

Id. 1787.
Id. 1798.

169 Id.

1798-1800.

170 Id. 1799.

The Abood Court went on to make explicit what itwas not

holding:
We do not hold that a union cannot constitutionally spend funds for
the expression of political views, on behalf of political candidates, or
towards the advancement of other ideological causes not germane to its
duties as collective bargaining representative.

Rather, the Constitution

requires only that such expenditures be financed from charges, dues, or
assessments paid by employees who do not object to advancing those ideas
and who are not coerced into doing so against their will by the threat of
loss of governmental employment.
Id. 1800.
171 Id. 1795.
17299 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970).
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The state action question under the NLRA need not be
reached if the statute is authoritatively construed to prohibit
the nonconsensual use of dues for political purposes, as the Court
construed the Railway Labor Act in Street. Although the Supreme
Court has never given the Act such a construction, some unions have
tacitly acknowledged that such a construction is applicable. 173 As
a result, many unions have voluntarily allowed members to contract
out of any political activities. 174 If the Act were not construed to
forbid compulsory political contributions, it would then be necessary to determine if sufficient state action were present to activate
an Abood-type constitutional analysis.
D. Union Activity as State Action
Unlike the Railway Labor Act, section 14 (b) of the NLRA
does allow states to prohibit union shop agreements. This distinction alone led the Tenth Circuit to conclude that the use of nonunion employees' dues in an agency shop situation for political
purposes would raise no first amendment problems, as the state's position in this case is "neutral and permissive." 175 This neutral stance
presumably stems from the fact that the NLRA permits the states
76
to forbid union security agreements. The First 1 and Ninth1,'
Circuits have disagreed, refusing to distinguish between the Railway Labor Act and the NLRA.

8
In Linscott v. Millers Falls Co.,"

the First Circuit reasoned that "[i]f federal support attaches to the
union shop if and when two parties agree to it, it is the same support, once it attaches, even though the consent of a third party,
the state, is a precondition." 19 The court thus found the same
degree of government involvement under the NLRA to justify a
finding of state action, regardless of the fact that a state could
revoke union security agreements. In fact, the First Circuit may
have underestimated the degree of federal involvement. The NLRA
does not require the consent of the state but rather permits the
state to outlaw union shops. From a political and practical view173 See, e.g., Reid v. UAW, 479 F.2d 517, 518 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1076 (1973).
174 See, e.g., Seay v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 371 F. Supp. 754, 758-59

(C.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd in part and Tev'd in part, 533 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1976).
175 Reid v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 443 F.2d 408, 410 (10th Cir. 1971).
176 See Linscott v. Millers Falls Co., 440 F.2d 14 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 872 (1971).
177 See Seay v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 427 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1970).
178440 F.2d 14 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 872 (1971).

179

Id. 16.
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point, mustering the support to pass a "right-to-work" law is more
difficult than preventing the passage of a bill permitting union security agreements. Inactivity is often the more politically expedient
route; in this instance that inertia favors the proponents of union
security agreements.
In Abood the Supreme Court cited language from the Hanson
opinion that supported a finding of government action: "[T]he
federal statute is the source of the power and authority by which
The enactment of the
any private rights are lost or sacrificed ....
federal statute authorizing union shop agreements is the governmental action on which the Constitution operates ... ." 10 Therefore, if faced with a first amendment claim by a dissenting union
member under the NLRA, the Court would be confronted with
two alternatives: 1) the use of such dues might be held to violate
the dissenter's first amendment rights; or 2) as in the case of the
Railway Labor Act, the NLRA might be interpreted to prohibit
such a use, thereby making the application of Street remedies
appropriate.
E. The Application of Street Remedies to the NLRA
The NLRA declares it to be national policy to encourage "the
practice and procedure of collective bargaining." 181 To facilitate
collective bargaining, a union selected by a majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit is designated as the exclusive bargaining representative for all employees in that unit,
whether or not they belong to the union. 182 Except where specifically prohibited by state law, the collective agreements entered
into by the employer and the exclusive representatives may include
union security clauses similar to the one in Street. Five different
factual situations that arise under the NLRA present the question
whether the Street remedies should be available to a given dissenter:
1) In the event the union does not represent the majority of
employees and therefore is not the exclusive bargaining agent,
the individual employee may nonetheless voluntarily join the
union;
2) In the event the union does not represent the majority of
employees and therefore is not the exclusive bargaining agent,
180 97 S. Ct. at 1791 n.12.
18129 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
18229 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
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the individual employee may decline to join the union without
risking his job security;
3) If the union is chosen by a majority of the employees as
their bargaining agent and if no union security agreement is
reached, the employee may decline to join the union, but it
will still be his bargaining representative;
4) If the union is chosen by a majority of the employees as
their bargaining agent and if no union security agreement is
reached, the employee may voluntarily join the union;
5) If the union is chosen by a majority of the employees as
their bargaining agent and if a union security agreement is
signed by the employer and the union, the employee will be
required to become a union member within thirty days of
employment, subject to the proviso of section 8(a)(3) of the
NLRA., 3
If the individual is not a union member, or is not required
to pay dues under a union security agreement (cases 2 and 3), the
issue of the union's use of his dues monies for political purposes
cannot arise; therefore, no analysis of the applicability of the Street
remedies is required. In the other cases, an analysis of the unionemployee relationship is necessary.
In the case of an employee who voluntarily joins a union that
is not the exclusive bargaining representative for collective bargaining purposes (case 1), the arguments for making the Street remedies
available are the least persuasive. The employee's membership in
the union is not compelled by a union security agreement authorized by statute, nor must the employee rely on this union to bargain
for him, a situation that might induce him to join the union even
if not required by a union security agreement. Although the
minority union may bargain for him if there is no majority bargaining representative, the employee is free to bargain for himself
or to support the efforts of another union in its effort to gain
18329 U.S.C.

§ 158(a)(3)

(1970).

The proviso states:

That no employer shall justify any discrimination against an employee for
nonmembership in a labor organization (A) if he has reasonable grounds
for believing that such membership was not available to the employee on
the same terms and conditions generally applicable to other members, or
(B) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that membership was
denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure of the employee to
tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a
condition of acquiring or retaining membership.
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majority status. His membership is neither required by a union
security agreement nor economically compelled by the union's status
as exclusive bargaining representative. If he disagrees with the
political causes supported by the union with his dues, the employee
may terminate his union membership without fear of losing his job
or forfeiting all input into his bargaining relationship with the
employer. Although the employee may not desire to sever his
relationship with the union to this degree, but may prefer to remain
a member while retaining the Street remedies for political expenditures to which he objects, his dues cannot be considered "exacted
funds" as were the dues collected under the union security agreement in Street.284
In the case of an employee who is bound by a union security
agreement (case 5), an exact parallel of the Street case is presented.
The same considerations support a finding that the NLRA does not
authorize the nonconsensual use of exacted dues for political purposes. Because the employee is compelled to join the union under
a statutorily sanctioned union security agreement, the question
whether the employee would have joined the union voluntarily
absent the union security clause is extraneous to the analysis. The
crux of the issue is that the employee must maintain his dues-paying
membership under the agreement to avoid the risk of losing his job.
Unlike the employee in case 1, he may not resign from the union
in protest of the union's political activities without risking serious
repercussions.
The most difficult case is presented by an employee who belongs
to a majority union that is not covered by union security clause
(case 4). Unlike his counterpart in case 5, he is free to quit the
union without risking the loss of his job. Unlike case 1, however,
the union continues to be his bargaining representative even if he
leaves the union in protest. Although the exclusive bargaining
agent owes a duty of fair representation to all whom it represents
and not just to its members,18 5 the employee may feel that to be
forced to quit his union in order to forestall the expenditure of his
dues monies for political purposes that he opposes is an unacceptable
alternative. By resigning from the union he loses his rights as a
union member.18 6 By foregoing those rights, which include discussion of union business and nomination and election of union
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 768-69 (1961).
185 Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
186 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-15 (1970).
184
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officers,' 8 7 he may lose his ability to affect the formation of the
collective agreement that structures the legally binding terms and
conditions of his employment. 88 A union member faced with such
a Hobson's choice might well argue that the NLRA incorporates
Street-type remedies. The fact that a statute establishes a majority union as the exclusive bargaining representative led to the
formulation of a duty of fair representation. 8 9 Analogous considerations would justify the application of Street remedies in this
case, primarily because the Street remedies permit the employee to
exercise his first amendment rights without foregoing his rights
within the union structure. 190
However well the Street remedies may protect dissenting union
members when unions act within the bounds of the law, different
considerations come into play when there is a statutory violation.
The final section of this Comment will consider the remedies available to protect the interests of union dissidents and the general
public should a union or its officials violate the current statutory
prohibitions. Due to the similar statutory treatment afforded
unions and corporations, cases involving corporate stockholders will
also be considered.
V.

REMEDIES FOR STATUTORY VIOLATIONS

BY UNIONS

The clearest remedy for violations of the statutory prohibition
against the use of a union's general treasury funds for electioneering
aimed at the public is a criminal prosecution. The Department of
Justice is empowered to press charges when an individual or an
organization violates the Federal Election Campaign Act.191 In
United States v. Boyle, 92 such charges were successfully brought
under section 610 of title 18 against W. A. Boyle, former president
of the United Mine Workers. The Circuit Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia asserted that in order for the government
to prevail under section 610, it must establish that "(1) a labor
organization (2) made a contribution or expenditure (8) in con187

Id. §411(a)(1) & (2).

188

See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).

189 Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
190 Cf. Comment, Employee Challenges to Arbitral Awards: A Model for Pro-

tecting Individual Rights Under the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 125 U. PA.
L. Rav. 1310 (1977) (a union member should not be compelled to sue his own
union in a duty of fair representation suit in order to vindicate his rights under the
contract).
191 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283,
in 2 U.S.C. § 437g).
192 482 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1076 (1973).

§ 109, 90 Stat. 475, 485-86 (to be codified
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nection with a specified federal election (4) for purposes of active
electioneering and that (5) the defendant officer consented to the
making of the contribution." 193 In addition to the criminal provisions of FECA, the Federal Election Commission is charged with
civil enforcement of the statute. The Commission may seek injunctive relief against any ongoing violations. 194 Furthermore, the
Commission may refer a case to the Department of Justice for
investigation and possible prosecution. 195
More difficult questions arise when individual union members
or stockholders seek redress for statutory violations. Injunctive
relief is beyond the reach of individuals because the responsibility
for seeking this remedy is explicitly vested in the Federal Election
Commission.'9 6 On the federal level, individual union members
and shareholders in corporations have attempted to prosecute civil
suits based on section 610 197 and the duty of fiduciary responsibility.1 8s

The major case in this area is Cort v. Ash. 199

In Cort a

shareholder of Bethlehem Steel, a Delaware corporation, asserted
an implied private cause of action against the corporation and its
directors for an alleged violation of section 610. The Supreme
Court, reversing the Third Circuit, found that the "implication
193 Id. 760.
In addition to the conviction under § 610, Boyle was convicted
of violating the statutory duty of fiduciary responsibility. Id. 764-66. The duty
of fiduciary responsibility requires union officials "to hold [the union's] money and
property solely for the benefit of the organization and its members and to manage,
invest, and expend the same in accordance with its constitution and bylaws and any
resolutions of the governing bodies adopted thereunder." 29 U.S.C. §501(a)
(1970). If expenditures are authorized by the union in accordance with its constitution, that constitutes a defense to the charge of violating fiduciary responsibility,
but it is not a defense to a charge of violating the Federal Election Campaign Act.
McNamara v. Johnston, 522 F.2d 1157, 1165 & n.10 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 911 (1976).
194 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283,
§ 109, 90 Stat. 475, 483-86 (to be codified in 2 U.S.C. § 437g).
195 Id.
196 See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975); McNamara v. Johnston, 522 F.2d
1157, 1162 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976). Dissident union
members have, however, successfully sought declaratory judgments invalidating dues
allocations to political funds when the expenditure of those funds would have
violated the statute. See Barber v. Gibbons, 367 F. Supp. 1102 (E.D. Mo. 1973).
S97
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
198 McNamara v. Johnston, 522 F.2d 1157 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 911 (1976). Further possibilities include derivative suits or individual suits
for damages under state law. In a discussion of state and common law remedies
in the case of a shareholder of a corporation, it has been suggested that "[t]o
prevail in an action for damages against a corporate official who approved a political
expenditure, the shareholder must prove that the official's conduct either constituted
ultra vires activity or was in breach of his or her fiduciary duty." Note, Corporate
Democracy and the Corporate Political Contribution, 61 IowA L. REv. 545, 566
(1975).
199422 U.S. 66 (1975).
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of such a federal cause of action is not suggested by the legislative
context of § 610 or required to accomplish Congress' purposes in
enacting the statute." 200 The Court's decision hinged in part on
its assertion that Congress was primarily concerned with the effect
of aggregate corporate wealth on federal elections rather than with
the internal relations between a corporation and its stockholders.20 1
The Court added a twist to Cort by suggesting that the factors militating against the implication of a private cause of action
in the case of a corporate shareholder might not be present in the
case of a dissident union member who institutes a civil damage
action against the union based on a statutory violation. The Court
based this dictum on its conclusion that there existed a great degree
of concern for the protection of union members when labor unions
were included within the coverage of section 610. The Court
reasoned:
This difference in emphasis may reflect a recognition that,'
while a stockholder acquires his stock voluntarily and is
free to dispose of it, union membership and the payment
of union dues is often involuntary because of union security and checkoff provisions. ..

.

It is therefore argu-

able that the federal interest in the relationship between
members and their unions is much greater than the
parallel interest in the relationship between stockholders
and state-created corporations. In fact, the permanent
expansion of § 610 to include labor unions was part of
comprehensive labor legislation, the Taft-Hartley Act of
only
1947, while the 1907 Act dealt with corporations
202
with regard to their impact on federal elections.
The implication of a private right of action from a statute that
does not expressly authorize such a right depends partly on the
extent to which the existing enforcement mechanism is inadequate to serve the purposes of the statute.2 0 3 The Court's logic with
respect to the dictum on implying a private cause of action against
unions is therefore flawed on two grounds. First, if the primary
purpose of FECA is indeed to counteract the effect of aggregate
wealth, as was asserted in Cort, rather than to regulate the internal
affairs of corporations, the implication of a private right of action
200 Id.

69.

201 Id.

81-82.

202 d.

81 n.13.

203

Comment, Private Rights of Action Under Amtrak and Ash: Some Implica-

tions for Implication, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1392, 1393 (1975).
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against a union is similarly unwarranted. The Court acknowledged
in Cort v. Ash that the congressional concern with counteracting
the effects of aggregate wealth did not justify the implication of a
private right of action because the enforcement mechanism established by FECA was sufficient. 20 4 This reasoning applies equally to
unions, which are subject to the same criminal and civil penalties
as corporations under FECA.20 5 Second, even if the federal interest
in regulating the internal affairs of unions is stronger under FECA
for the reasons mentioned in Cort, the remedies suggested in this
Comment would adequately protect the interests of individual union
members, who might otherwise have no recourse besides a civil
damage suit to remedy the use of union funds in a manner that
20 6
violates both the statute and their rights within the union.
VI. CONCLUSION

Although the federal courts have considered the legislative
scheme regulating the political activities of labor unions for nearly
thirty years, the Supreme Court has steadfastly declined to rule
on its constitutionality. Congress, however, has refined its legislation in this area, partly in response to guidance from the Court's
opinions. Consequently, the present regulatory system contains a
general prohibition of contributions or expenditures aimed at the
general public in connection with a federal election financed by
general union funds, while specifically permitting expenditures and
regulated contributions from separate voluntary funds. This system
fulfills the twin legislative goals in this area of abating the dangers
of aggregated wealth and protecting dissident union members. The
present system thereby reflects a balance between the legitimate state
interest of preventing corruption, or the appearance of corruption,
in the political system, and the rights of association and freedom of
expression of union members. The present system therefore passes
constitutional muster because it reasonably distinguishes between
204 422 U.S. at 84.
205 If an implied cause of action can be viewed as a deterrent to statutory

violations, the greatest need for a deterrent may in fact exist in the case of corporations, not unions, notwithstanding Cort's language concerning the stronger federal

interest in unions. First, the resources available to corporations which could
potentially be used to contravene the statute are vastly superior to those of unions.
See A. HEAnD, supra note 11, at 171 & n.8. Second, despite the claim of shareholder control, unions are more democratic institutions because unions operate on
a one-man-one-vote principle, while corporations operate on a one-share-one-vote
principle, which makes them susceptible to control by a small group of individuals.
See A. RosENTHAL, supra note 25, at 29-30; Rauh, Legality of Union Political

Expenditures, 34 S. CAL. L. REv. 152, 162 n.49 (1961).
206 See text accompanying notes 181-90 supra.
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the restrictions of political expression that may be placed on individuals and unions. The statute's regulation of unions' political
contributions and expenditures is narrowly drawn in order to allow
political activity funded by separate, voluntary contributions by
union members.
Although the statutory restrictions on union political activities
are constitutional, the leeway accorded to unions may raise constitutional questions when dissident union members are required to
contribute to causes that they oppose. The Court has construed
the Railway Labor Act to prevent the compulsory subsidization by
union members in a union shop context of causes to which they
object. In a case where such a statutory construction was unavailable, the Court found that such involuntary subsidization, sanctioned by the state, violates the members' first amendment rights.
This Comment has suggested that when a union, pursuant to the
NLRA, enjoys a union shop agreement or is the exclusive bargaining representative for the employees, the requisite state action is
present to trigger a similar analysis for dissident union members
who are represented by that union and who have made their objections known to it. In this case, however, the NLRA, like the Railway Labor Act, should be construed as not permitting such an
involuntary subsidization in order to avoid a finding of unconstitutionality. If dissident members are afforded the same remedies
suggested by Street, their first amendment rights will be protected
at the same time that the underlying and sometimes contradictory
purposes of FECA will be achieved.

